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I.  INTRODUCTION 
If knowledge is power, then certainly the secret and unlimited acquisition 
of the most detailed knowledge about the most intimate aspects of a 
person’s thoughts and actions conveys extraordinary power over that 
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person’s life and reputation to the snooper who possesses the highly 
personal information.  And by vastly expanding the range and power of 
the snooper’s eyes, ears, and brains, the new technology facilitates and 
magnifies the acquisition and use of such information.  Moreover, as long 
as surveillance technology remains unregulated and continues to grow at 
an accelerated rate, the free and enriching exercise of the rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights will inevitably be 
chilled to the point of immobility by the general awareness that Big 
Brother commands the tools of omniscience.1 
Modern technological advancements have sparked an increased level of caution 
as individuals seek to guard private information.  As cellular phones, scanners, 
scramblers and the like become more common in average American households, it 
becomes obvious that high tech devices have become readily attainable by the public 
at large.  Accordingly, protection of information once held private by merely 
“shutting the door” or “whispering” has, perhaps, become a luxury of the past.  
Accordingly, while technology provides more efficient methods of completing 
everyday tasks, it may also serve as one of this generation’s most formidable foes.  
Absent appropriate regulation, technologies pertaining to surveillance may encroach 
upon individual privacy in ways not contemplated by current legislation. 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19682 (hereinafter 
“Federal Wiretap Act”), as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
of 19863 (hereinafter “EPCA”) and the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act4 (hereinafter “1994 Amendments”), serves as the primary federal 
law with respect to the regulation of surveillance activity.  More specifically, Title III 
of the Federal Wiretap Act, as amended, remains the “primary law guarding the 
privacy of personal communication [among private citizens] in the United States.”5  
This piece of legislation will serve as the focal point of this Note.   
Currently before the Supreme Court of the United States6 is the case of Bartnicki 
v. Vopper.7  In this case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the appellants 
had successfully demonstrated the unconstitutionality of the portion of Title III 
which grants a civil cause of action to anyone whose “. . . [illegally intercepted] wire, 
                                                                
1STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th CONG., SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY III 
(Comm. Print 1976). 
2Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).  (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520). 
3Pub. L. No. 99-508, 101(c)(1)(A), 100 Stat. 1851 (1986).  (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2521). 
4Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 202(a), 108 Stat. 4279 (1994).  (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510). 
5S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556 [hereinafter 
S. REP. NO. 541]. 
6David L. Hudson Jr., staff attorney for the First amendment Center at Vanderbilt 
University, in an article written for the ABA Journal, stated that this case might “arguably [be] 
the most important First Amendment case this term.”  David L. Hudson, Speaking of Firsts ... 
First Amendment Free-Speech Cases May Turn Into Blockbusters, 86 A.B.A. J., Oct. 2000, at 
30. 
7200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1260 (2000). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss4/6
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oral, or electronic communication . . . [is] disclosed”8 on the premise that such 
regulation violates the discloser’s free speech rights under the First Amendment.9  
This holding in support of the First Amendment rights of the discloser stands in 
direct opposition to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in support of the 
victim’s privacy rights in the similar case of Boehner v. McDermott.10  
This Note will first discuss the history and context of the statute under which 
these cases have arisen.  It will then survey various Supreme Court cases addressing 
the tension between the First Amendment and the right to privacy so as to provide 
the reader with a better understanding of the conflict between these two 
constitutional rights.  Then it will outline and analyze the positions held by the Third 
and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals.  Since the Supreme Court has elected to resolve 
the conflict among the federal circuits, this Note will ultimately attempt to provide a 
solution that best honors the opposing interests and establishes a uniform rule with 
respect to the federal government’s ability to regulate in this area.11 
II.  THE STATUTE IN GENERAL – HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL 
WIRETAP ACT 
The advent of modern technology allows law enforcement agencies and private 
citizens to eavesdrop with ease, making it imperative for the Court to expand the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment so as to protect individuals from misuse of such 
technologies.  According to its original interpretation, the Fourth Amendment was 
literally limited in its application to unreasonable intrusions into a citizen’s “houses, 
papers and effects.”12  Accordingly, arguments have been made that electronic 
surveillance devices do not violate the provisions of the Fourth Amendment because 
no actual physical intrusion necessarily occurs.  This view was aptly illustrated in 
Olmstead v. United States,13 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that 
merely tapping someone’s telephone line without actually entering his property was 
not a violation of the person’s Fourth Amendment rights because “those who 
intercepted the projected voices were not in the house of either party to the 
conversation.”14  Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead, however, stated that: 
Ways may some day be developed by which the [g]overnment, without 
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by 
                                                                
818 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000). 
9The statute does require that the discloser of the information “[know] or [have] reason to 
know that the information was obtained [using an illegal wiretap as defined by the statute.]”  
Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c). 
10191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d by, remanded by, No. 98-7156, 2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 27798, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 2001). 
11At the time this Note was authored the Court had not yet ruled in Bartnicki.  It’s ruling, 
however, will pre-date the publication date of this Note due to the time delay involved in the 
publication process.  
12U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
13277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
14Id. 
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which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences 
of the home … Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection 
against such invasions of individual security?15 
Some thirty-nine years later, in Katz v. United States,16 the Court accepted the 
view expressed by Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent.  In Katz, the defendant had been 
convicted under a federal statute prohibiting transmission of wagering information 
by telephone.17  The conviction, however, resulted from the introduction of 
surveillance evidence acquired by law enforcement officials.18  FBI agents had 
“attached an electronic listening . . . device to the outside of the public telephone 
booth from which the defendant had placed his calls.”19  Overturning the lower 
court’s ruling that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred,20 the Supreme 
Court concluded that “[t]he [g]overnment’s activities in electronically listening to 
and recording [the defendant’s] words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably 
relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”21  This finding by the Court marked 
a significant expansion of Fourth Amendment applicability as it afforded protection 
to “people – and not simply ‘areas’ – against unreasonable searches and seizures.”22  
The Court noted that application of the Fourth Amendment could no longer turn 
upon the “presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”23  
This decision set the stage for the Congressional enactment of legislation affording 
statutory protection against the unreasonable use of surveillance technology. 
In the year following Katz, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968,24 the partial purpose of which was “to deal with increasing 
threats to privacy resulting from the growing use of sophisticated electronic 
devices.”25  Title III of the Act26 placed restrictions (absent a warrant to the contrary) 
                                                                
15Id. at 474. 
16389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
17Generally speaking, the statute imposes criminal penalties upon those “engaged in the 
business of betting or wagering [who] knowingly use[ ] a wire communication facility for the 
transmission . . . of bets or wagers . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2002). 
18Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
19Id. 
20See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966), rev’d by, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967).  The court of appeals rejected the Fourth Amendment claim stating that “[t]here was 
no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner].” 
21Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
22Id. 
23Id. 
24This Act attempted to update the Federal Communications Act of 1934.  See S. REP. NO. 
90-1097, at 70 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154 [hereinafter S. REP. NO. 
1097]. 
25State v. Howard, 679 P.2d 197, 201 (Kan. 1984) (citing United States v. Carroll, 332 F. 
Supp. 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss4/6
2001] THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY OF THE CIVIL PROVISIONS 687 
 
upon the interception and disclosure of information obtained through wiretapping or 
other means of interception.  Despite Congress’ efforts to adequately update the law, 
the provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act soon became outdated as well.  For 
example, under its original terms, the Act’s applicability did not reach the 
interception of conversations using electronic equipment.27  Recognizing that its 
original provisions had not kept up with technological advancements, Senator 
Leahy28 commented that the existing law was “hopelessly out of date,”29 and 
proposed the EPCA in 1986. 
Surprisingly, even the amended provisions of the EPCA failed to accurately 
define Congress’ intent for an extended period of time.30  Under its original 
provisions, the Federal Wiretap Act failed to protect conversations made on cordless 
or cellular phones (and the like).31  As was the case previously, technology continued 
to advance making cordless and cell phones common household commodities.  It 
was not until 1994 that Congress once again amended the Federal Wiretap Act so as 
to include cordless and cellular phones.32 
In its current form, pursuant to the 1986 and 1994 Amendments, the Federal 
Wiretap Act, provides in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who– 
. . .  
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person 
the contents of any wire, oral or electronic communication, knowing or 
having reason to know that the information was obtained through the 
interception of a wire, oral or electronic communication in violation of 
this subsection; 
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral 
or electronic communication, knowingly or having reason to know that 
the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral or 
electronic communication in violation of this subsection . . . shall be 
punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as 
provided in subsection (5).33 
Furthermore, it goes on to provide: 
(a) In general.  Except as provided in § 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose 
wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or 
                                                          
2618 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 et seq. (2002). 
27See S. REP. NO. 1097, supra note 24, at 70.  Under it’s original terms the Act only 
applied to interceptions that could be heard by the human ear. 
28The bill was co-sponsored in 1986 with Senator Mathias. 
29S. REP. NO. 541, supra note 5, at 2. 
30McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1995). 
31Id. 
32See supra note 4. 
3318 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (c) – (d) (2000). 
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intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover 
from the person or entity which engaged in the violation such relief as 
may be appropriate.34 
Ardent First Amendment advocates seem to find these sections offensive due to the 
limitations placed on the discloser’s ability to disseminate acquired information.  
While the statute does seem to avoid a carte blanch restriction by imposing liability 
only when the discloser “knows” or has “reason to know” that the information was 
obtained in violation of the statute, free speech advocates presumably feel that any 
limitation on an individual’s ability to disseminate information is inappropriate.  
Conversely, advocates of the right to privacy may argue that, while free speech is an 
important constitutional privilege, its use, under appropriate guidelines, may be 
curtailed so as to protect the interests of the citizenry.  Obviously, both viewpoints 
are well taken and arguable on many different fronts.  However, co-existence of 
these interests, unless carefully defined, seems to be improbable. 
It is these provisions, and the constitutional quandary they present, that serves as 
the point of contention in the Bartnicki and Boehner cases discussed in Section III.  
It is important to realize that, while not indicated anywhere in the statute itself, the 
Senate may have foreseen the potential conflicts between the First Amendment and 
the right of privacy.35  Nevertheless Congress’ failure to expressly address the issue 
has produced the litigation now before the United States Supreme Court.   
III.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW ADDRESSING THE TENSION BETWEEN 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Whether Congress foresaw the possibility of conflict between the First 
Amendment and the right to privacy or not, while interesting, provides no significant 
assistance in resolving the conflicts now before the Supreme Court.  Furthermore, 
while it may appear that these conflicts are only now arising (in the form of the 
Bartnicki case), such an assumption would be a far cry from reality.  In fact, as 
discussed infra, the Supreme Court has pondered these issues, and how they relate, 
numerous times over the past thirty years.  Consequently, an assessment of such 
considerations will greatly assist the reader in understanding the direction in which 
the Court has been moving over the past three decades, in addition to the fervor with 
which it has sought to protect both of these paramount constitutional rights.  This 
section will survey the most significant cases that the Supreme Court has heard with 
respect to these issues. 
In June of 1971 the Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v. United States,36 
made a bold ruling with regard to the government’s ability to restrict the press.  This 
case involved the possible publication of a classified study entitled “History of U.S. 
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy” that had been illegally acquired by 
The New York Times and the Washington Post.37  Finding the study to be of 
significant public interest, the two newspapers prepared to publish the contents of the 
                                                                
3418 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (2000) (amended 2001). 
35See S. REP. NO. 1097, supra note 24, at 2181. 
36403 U.S. 713 (1971).  These cases have often been called the “Pentagon Papers” cases 
due to the fact the classified documents had been removed from the Pentagon. 
37United State v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.3d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss4/6
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report.38  In an effort to prevent disclosure of this classified information, the 
government unsuccessfully sought injunctions from the district courts of both the 
District of Columbia and the Southern District of New York.39  On appeal, the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the lower court’s refusal to grant an 
injunction while the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the case for 
further hearings.40 
The United States Supreme Court held, in a per curium opinion, that the 
government had failed to meet the burden of showing ample justification for the 
imposition of prior restraint of expression.41  In his concurrence, Justice Douglas, 
quoting the First Amendment, determined that according to the text alone there is 
“no room for governmental restraint on press.”42  Further illustrating his point, he 
noted that no federal statute forbade the publication of such information.43  The 
Court, however, did recognize that restraint may not always be inappropriate.  Justice 
Brennan, in his concurrence, wrote “our judgments in the present cases may not be 
taken to indicate the propriety, in the future, of issuing temporary stays and 
restraining orders to block publication of material sought to be suppressed by the 
Government.”44  Curiously, no mention was made of the fact that the information 
was obtained illegally.  The Court’s only concern seemed to be the prevention of 
unbridled suppression of the newspapers.  Justice Burger, however, in his dissent, 
felt that the Court did not know the facts and was in no better position than were the 
lower courts to resolve the conflict.45  Accordingly, he felt these cases were anything 
but “simple.”46  Even if the facts had been known, though, he still reasoned that the 
First Amendment is not an “absolute.”47  Justices Harlan and Blackmun also wrote 
dissenting opinions further illustrating the Court’s division with respect to the 
application of the First Amendment in cases where it offends privacy.  Thus began 
the Supreme Court’s thirty-year debate regarding the tension between the First 
Amendment and the right to privacy. 
Four years later, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,48 the Court considered, in 
light of the First Amendment, the constitutionality of a Georgia statute which made it 
                                                                
38Id. 
39Id. 
40See U.S. v. N.Y. Times Co., 444 F.2d 544, 544 (2d Cir. 1971), rev’d, 403 U.S. 713 
(1971).  Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1971), aff’d, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
41N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (citing Bantam Books v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) noting that “[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression 
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity”)  
42N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
43Id. 
44Id. at 724-25. 
45Id. at 748 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
46Id. 
47N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 748. 
48420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
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a misdemeanor “to publish or broadcast the name or identity of a rape victim.”49 In 
that case, the appellee’s seventeen-year-old daughter had been raped and killed.50  
Six months after the incident hearings were held in which five of six defendants pled 
guilty to the alleged crimes.51  During the course of the proceedings, a reporter 
learned the identity of the victim by reading the indictments that were made available 
to him by the court.52  He subsequently broadcasted the victim’s identity on a local 
television station (Cox Broadcasting).53  Soon thereafter, the appellee filed suit. 
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court determined that the lower court had 
erroneously found a cause of action arising from the statute at issue.54  Instead, the 
proper cause of action, according to the Georgia Supreme Court, lay in the common 
law torts of “public disclosure” or “invasion of privacy.”55  The court did, however, 
address the First Amendment issue holding that the statute did not violate the 
Constitution.56  Citing Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association,57 the court stated that 
“the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the 
right to privacy.  The goals sought by each may be achieved with a minimum of 
intrusion upon the other.”58  Accordingly, the court sustained the statute as a 
“legitimate limitation on the right of freedom of expression contained in the First 
Amendment.”59 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Georgia Supreme Court, holding 
that “[s]tates may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information 
contained in official court records open to public inspection.”60  This ruling did not 
come at the total expense of privacy interests.  The Court provided exhaustive 
comments on the importance of the right to privacy and its development over the 
past century of American jurisprudence.61  However, recognizing the importance of 
public awareness of public activities in the context of political activity, the Court 
highlighted the fact that the information at issue came from public records.62  
Therefore, despite their importance, “[privacy interests] fade when the information 
                                                                
49Id. at 471 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972)). 
50Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 471.  
51Id. at 472. 
52Id. 
53Id. at 473-74. 
54Id. at 474. 
55Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 474. 
56Id. at 475. 
57483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971). 
58Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 475. 
59Id. 
60Id. at 495. 
61Id. at 487 (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193 (1890)). 
62Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 493. 
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involved already appears on the public record.”63  The Court also feared the 
“chilling” effect that might result by validating sanctions for the publication of 
“certain public information.”64  Such a ruling, in the eyes of the Court, “would invite 
timidity and self-censorship and very likely lead to the suppression of many items 
that would otherwise be published . . . .”65 
The Court’s next decision in this area arose two years later in Oklahoma 
Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County.66  In that case, the District Court of Oklahoma 
County enjoined members of the media from publishing the identity of an eleven-
year-old boy who had appeared before the court on second-degree murder charges.67  
Having not held the hearings in private, as was permissible under Oklahoma law, the 
judge sought to maintain the minor’s privacy by enjoining, any disclosure by the 
media after the fact.68  Such restrictions were not well received by the media and 
resulted in the filing of an “application for prohibition and mandamus challenging 
the order as a prior restraint on the press” in violation of the First Amendment.69  
This challenge was subsequently denied by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.70 
Recalling Cox, as well as its then most recent decision in Nebraska Press 
Association v. Stuart,71 the Court affirmed its belief that information in the public 
domain should not be suppressed.72  Because the district court judge failed to 
conduct private hearings that would have prevented the information from entering 
the public record, the information passed beyond the reach of suppression and 
became protected under the First Amendment.73  Accordingly, the Court reversed.74 
Following Oklahoma Publishing, the Court heard Landmark Communications v. 
Virginia.75  This case differed from the previous cases in that the disclosed 
                                                                
63Id. at 494-95.  Note, however, that while this ruling does strike a blow to privacy 
interests, the Court’s holding is quite narrow.  Refusing to state a broad rule, the Court plainly 
stated that “it is appropriate to focus [only] on the narrow[ ] interface between press and 
privacy that this case presents, namely, whether the State may impose sanctions on the 
accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records. …”  Id. at 491. 
64Id. at 496. 
65Id. 
66430 U.S. 308 (1977). 
67Id. at 308-09. 
68Id. at 309. 
69Id. at 308. 
70Id. at 309. 
71427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
72Oklahoma Publ’g Co., 430 U.S. at 310-11 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 
362-63 (1966) (“[T]here is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that 
transpire in the courtroom.”); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (“Those who see and 
hear what transpired [in the courtroom] can report it with impunity.”)).   
73Oklahoma Publ’g Co., 430 U.S. at 311. 
74Id. at 312. 
75435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
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information in question was not acquired from review of documents in the public 
domain.  In this case, a newspaper (Landmark) reported on a pending judicial 
inquiry76 identifying the state judge whose conduct was under investigation.77  The 
newspaper’s conduct was held to be a violation of  Virginia law which made it illegal 
to “[divulge] the identification of a Judge of a Court not of record, which said Judge 
was the subject of an investigation and hearing. …”78  Rejecting, inter alia, the 
newspaper’s First Amendment defense, the trial court found the newspaper guilty 
and ordered payment of a fine and court costs.79  The Supreme Court of Virginia 
affirmed the lower court by resolving the First Amendment question through 
application of the “clear and present danger” test.80  It concluded that the three main 
functions that the statute sought to accomplish81 justified the belief that, “absent a 
requirement of confidentiality, the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission could 
not function properly or discharge effectively its intended purpose.”82   
The United States Supreme Court, rejecting the Supreme Court of Virginia’s 
application of the “clear and present danger” test,83 determined that the “narrow and 
limited question presented … is whether the First Amendment permits the criminal 
punishment of third persons who are strangers to the inquiry … for divulging or 
publishing truthful information regarding confidential proceedings. …”84  Because 
the information contained in the article was factually accurate and pertained to a 
“legislatively authorized inquiry,” the Court considered it to be of public 
significance.85  Citing Mills v. Alabama, the Court noted that “a major purpose of 
                                                                
76The judicial inquiry was being conducted by the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission.  Id. at 831. 
77Id. 
78Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-37.13 (Michie 1973) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Because such hearings were confidential it was apparent that the paper’s acquisition 
of the information arose from a “leak.”  Someone had violated the Commission’s 
confidentiality and provided the paper with the information.  Id. 
79Id. 
80Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 833. 
81The three functions identified by the Court were:   
[1] protection of a judge’s reputation from the adverse publicity which might flow 
from frivolous complaints, [2] maintenance of confidence in the judicial system by 
preventing the premature disclosure of a complaint before the Commission has 
determined that the charge is well founded, and [3] protection of complainants and 
witnesses from possible recrimination by prohibiting disclosure until the validity of 
the complaint has been ascertained.  Id. 
82Id. 
83Id. at 842. 
84Id. at 837.  In doing so, the Court drew attention to its refusal to consider a situation in 
which someone illegally obtains information and then divulges it.  Id.  This marks a major 
distinction between Landmark and Bartnicki. 
85Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 839. 
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[the First] Amendment [is] to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”86 
Accordingly, the Court found that the “[c]ommonwealth’s interests advanced by the 
imposition of criminal sanctions [were] insufficient to justify the actual and potential 
encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press.”87 
Landmark is distinguishable from the Court’s previous ruling in Cox. In 
Landmark, the statute in question provided criminal penalties rather than civil relief 
for the dissemination of information not yet in the public domain.88  Continuing its 
conservative interpretive approach, the Landmark Court provided yet another limited 
holding, answering only the narrow question presented by the specific facts of the 
case.89 
Only one year later the Court again granted review to a case involving the First 
Amendment and the right to privacy.  In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the 
Court considered “whether a West Virginia statute violat[ed] the First Amendment[] 
. . . by making it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without the written approval of 
the juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.”90  In this 
case, a fourteen-year-old youth shot and killed a fellow classmate at a local school.91  
Having been identified by seven of his classmates, he was arrested by police.92  
Hearing the report on a police radio, reporters from the Charleston Daily Mail and 
the Charleston Gazette went to the school where they learned the assailant’s 
identity.93  Aware of the statute, the Daily Mail refrained from releasing the youth’s 
name in the story.94   The Gazette, however, published his name and picture.95  
Assuming the information to now be “public information” the Daily Mail 
subsequently published the name as well.96 
Following an indictment against them, the newspapers immediately sought a writ 
of prohibition against the prosecuting attorney and the circuit court judges claiming 
that the indictment was based on charges arising from statutes that oppose, inter alia, 
the First Amendment.97  Considering the Supreme Court’s previous rulings on this 
issue, the West Virginia Supreme Court reasoned “that the statute operated as a prior 
restraint on speech and that the State’s interest in protecting the identity of the 
                                                                
86Id. at 838 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
87Id. 
88Id. at 840. 
89Id. at 838. 
90Smith, 443 U.S. 97, 98 (1979). 




95Smith, 443 U.S. at 99. 
96Id. at 100. 
97They filed an original jurisdiction petition directly with the West Virginia Supreme 
Court.  Id. 
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juvenile offender did not overcome the heavy presumption against the 
constitutionality of such prior restraints” and issued the writ of prohibition.98 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed with a typical, narrow 
holding limited only to the specific facts of the case.99  Again refusing to set a broad-
based standard, the Court looked only to the facts, the disclosure of a juvenile 
offender’s identity, and held that the State’s interests in protecting the anonymity of 
the juvenile is not sufficient to justify criminal sanctions against those who 
disseminate such information.100  Recognizing that no prior ruling specifically 
controlled, the Court did acknowledge that “recent decisions demonstrate that state 
action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy 
constitutional standards.”101  Distinguishing Cox, Landmark and Oklahoma 
Publishing, the Court still determined that “if the information is lawfully obtained . . 
. the state may not punish its publication except when necessary to further an interest 
more substantial than is present here.”102  It is important to note, however, that such a 
ruling, while seemingly detrimental to privacy interests, remains extremely limited in 
its applicability.103  Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in Smith v. Daily Mail 
Publishing Co., stated that “recognition [of the importance of free speech] has not 
meant that [it] always prevails over competing interests of the public . . . .  So valued 
is the liberty of speech . . . there is a tendency in cases such as this to accept virtually 
any contention supported by a claim of interference with speech or press.”104  
Clearly, this leaves the door open to the possibility that privacy interests, properly 
protected by a statute, may withstand First Amendment scrutiny.105 
The steady progression of cases until to this point was followed by a ten year dry 
spell of judicial activity in this area.  It was not until 1989 that the Supreme Court, in 
The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,106 considered the clash between the First Amendment and 
privacy, holding that a Florida statute, which made it unlawful to “print, publish or 
broadcast . . . in any instrument of mass communication”107 the name of a sexual 
assault victim, did not comport with the First Amendment.108 
                                                                
98Id. 
99Id. at 105. 
100Smith, 443 U.S. at 106. 
101Id. at 102. 
102Id. at 104. 
103Despite continued rulings in favor of the First Amendment, the United States Supreme 
Court has, in every case, been clear that its rulings are not to be interpreted broadly.  See 
Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. 
Oklahoma, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broad. Corp., v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
104Smith, 443 U.S. at 106-07. 
105Bartnicki v. Vopper, see infra Section IV, poses a situation that may justify such 
suppression. 
106491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
107FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (West 1987). 
108The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 526. 
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In that case, the appellee, B.J.F., reported that she had been robbed and sexually 
assaulted.109  The report generated from her interview with police included her 
identity and was placed in the police department’s pressroom where a reporter-
trainee of The Florida Star copied it.110  In violation of its own policy, The Florida 
Star then included the victim’s identity in an article it published.111  Subsequently, 
B.J.F. filed suit claiming that The Florida Star had violated Florida law by 
publishing her identity.112  After rejecting The Florida Star’s motion to dismiss on 
First Amendment grounds, the trial judge ruled that “§ 794.03 [the statute in 
question] was constitutional because it reflected a proper balance between the First 
Amendment and privacy rights, as it applied only to a narrow set of ‘rather sensitive 
. . . criminal offenses.’ ”113  The First District Court of Appeals affirmed and the 
Supreme Court of Florida denied discretionary review.114  Consequently, the United 
States Supreme Court granted review. 
Once again recognizing the “narrow holdings” of the past,115 the Court ultimately 
held in favor of the First Amendment and reversed the lower court’s imposition of 
damages against The Florida Star.116  Because the information had not yet “entered 
the public domain,” the Court distinguished the case from Cox and determined that 
the Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.  mode of analysis should apply.117   
Applying this test, the Court first found that the newspaper had “lawfully 
obtained” the information because it was readily made available by the police.118  
The Court did not, determine that the “state’s interests” (protection of a victim’s 
anonymity) justified suppression under the facts of this case.  The Court did clearly 
state, though, that “[it does] not rule out the possibility that, in a proper case, 
imposing civil sanctions for publication of the name of a rape victim might be so 
overwhelmingly necessary to advance these interests as to satisfy the Daily Mail 
standard.”119  Additionally, the Court called into question the actual effectiveness of 
                                                                
109Id. at 527. 
110Id. 
111Id. at 528. 
112Id. 
113The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 528. 
114Id. at 529. 
115
“Our cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate question, mindful that the 
future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving anticipatorily.”  Id. at 
532.  Such a position by the Court may prove beneficial for privacy interests in Barnicki, infra 
Section IV. 
116Id. at 541. 
117Id. at 533.  The Court was referring to the Daily Mail standard which holds that “[I]f a 
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then 
state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to 
further a state interest of the highest order.”  Smith, 433 U.S. at 103. 
118The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536. 
119Id. at 537. 
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the Florida law because it only limited disclosure in the context of “instrument[s] of 
mass communication.”120 
Last, but certainly not least, in 1991 the Court heard Cohen v. Cowles Media 
Co.121  Unlike many of the Court’s prior rulings, the media defendant in Cohen was 
held liable for damages, notwithstanding First Amendment protection.122  In this 
case, Dan Cohen, a Republican associated with the Republican gubernatorial 
campaign of 1982, approached members of the press of two different newspapers 
with information regarding one of the candidates.123  In doing so, he made it 
abundantly clear that disclosure of this information was premised on a promise of 
confidentiality.124  Despite a promise to the contrary, the editorial staffs of the two 
newspapers decided to disclose Cohen’s identity in their stories.125  Subsequently, 
Cohen sued claiming fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.126 
Rejecting the newspapers’ First Amendment argument, the trial court awarded a 
verdict in favor of Cohen.127  The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim but upheld the breach of contract claim.128  
Subsequently, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the breach of contract claim 
(under promissory estoppel) reasoning that it is still necessary to weigh the 
competing First Amendment interests when determining whether a free speech 
violation has occurred.129  In so doing, the court concluded that the “enforcement of 
the promise of confidentiality under a promissory estoppel theory would violate [the] 
defendant’s First Amendment rights.”130 
Surprisingly, in light of the previous cases discussed, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court finding no First Amendment 
violation.131  The Court determined that the Daily Mail rule, generally allowing 
publication of lawfully obtained information absent a need to further a state interest 
of the highest order, was inapplicable in this case.132  Rather, the Court classified the 
promissory estoppel cause of action as a law of “general applicability.”133  In short, 
                                                                
120Id. at 540. 
121501 U.S. at 663 (1991). 
122Cohen, 501 U.S. at 663. 
123Id. 
124Id. 
125Id. at 666. 
126Id. 
127Cohen, 501 U.S. at 666. 
128Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990). 
129Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990), rev’d, 501 U.S. 663 
(1991). 
130Id. 
131Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669. 
132Id. 
133Id. at 670. 
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“generally applicable” laws fail to single out a particular entity; rather, they equally 
restrict the citizenry at large.134  Consequently, a separate line of case law was 
determined to govern the facts of this case.135 
It has been held that “generally applicable laws do not offend the First 
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental 
effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”136  Accordingly, the press has 
remained limited in its newsgathering activities in many areas.137  This being the 
case, the Court determined that “enforcement of such general laws against the press 
is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other 
persons or organizations.”138  Accordingly, the Court distinguished Florida Star and 
Daily Mail by pointing out the fact that they involved statues that specifically limited 
the content of publications.139  Here, however, the only question at issue was whether 
the press should be held to its promise of confidentiality.  Such a requirement in no 
way attempts to specifically limit speech, and, therefore, escapes the strict scrutiny 
test of Florida Star and Daily Mail.140  
IV.  THE CURRENT CLASH BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PRIVACY 
Against this thirty-year background of case law, the Supreme Court has chosen, 
in Bartnicki v. Vopper, to once again address this controversial issue.  Only this time 
it will do so in the context of a federal statute and as a result of a split in decisions 
among the federal circuit courts of appeals.  Perhaps it is time for the Court to 
provide some finality in this area rather than crafting its holding as narrowly as it has 
chosen to do in the past.  
A.  State of the Law in the D.C. Circuit – Bartnicki v. Vopper 
From 1992 to 1994 the Wyoming Valley West School District was in contract 
negotiations with the Wyoming Valley West School District Teacher’s Union.141  
The negotiations were of significant public interest and served to generate frequent 
                                                                
134See id. 
135Id. at 669. 
136Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669. 
137See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (stating that press 
may not publish copyrighted materials); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (stating that 
reporters must respond to grand jury subpoena and reveal confidential source if asked to do 
so); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (stating that media must obey the 
National Labor Relations Act). 
138Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670. 
139Id. 
140The dissent in Cohen stated that this case was not one of “generally applicable laws.”  
Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  However, even if it were, the dissenters 
felt the result should differ.  Id.  The dissent, citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46 (1988), reminded the majority that Hustler involved “generally applicable laws” as 
well.  Id.  Yet, it was held that suppression of a satirical critique violated the First 
Amendment.  Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674. 
141Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
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media attention.  Gloria Bartnicki (plaintiff), the chief negotiator, and Anthony Kane 
(plaintiff), a teacher, served as the primary negotiators.142  Jack Yocum, one of 
several defendants, served as president of a local taxpayer organization opposing the 
union proposals.143  In 1993, Bartnicki and Kane participated in a phone conversation 
that was intercepted and recorded by an anonymous individual who subsequently left 
the recording in Yocum’s mailbox.144  Because the tape contained statements 
amounting to the use of violence against the School Board, Yocum seized the 
opportunity and passed the tape along to the local media who, in turn, disseminated it 
over the radio, on television and in some newspapers.145   
Bartnicki and Kane sued Yocum and several media defendants alleging 
violations of the Federal Wiretap Act146 and several state laws.147  The district court 
denied each party’s motion for summary judgment and determined that the federal 
statute in question did not violate the First Amendment.148  On appeal to the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the defendants successfully argued that application of 
§§ 2511 and 2520,149 in relevant part, violated their First Amendment rights150 by 
imposing upon them civil liability for disclosure of communications intercepted in 
violation of the Act. 
Recognizing the inapplicability and limited nature of past holdings,151 the court 
declined to “apply[] a test gleaned from Cox and its progeny, [but elected to review] 
First Amendment principles in light of the unique facts and circumstances of this 
case.”152  First, the court questioned the district court’s “general applicability” 
analysis, but failed to address it at length because, even if correct, the court felt that 
the district court applied the Cohen rule far too broadly, thus reaching an immature 
conclusion.153  A finding of “generally applicable” status does not, per Cohen, justify 
suppression of speech, as the district court’s quick resolution of the issue implies.  
Rather, in Cohen, the Court stated that, “enforcement of such general laws against 
the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement 
against other persons or organizations” (emphasis added).154  Therefore, a balancing 
                                                                




14628 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2000). 
147For purposes of this Note, only the federal law claims will be addressed. 
148Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 113.  In so doing the district court held, in reliance upon Cohen v. 
Cowles Media, Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), that the statutes are laws of “general applicability” 
and of no offense to the First Amendment.  Id. 
149See supra Section I for relevant text of the statutes. 
150Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129. 
151See supra notes 36-139, and accompanying text. 
152Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 117. 
153Id. at 118. 
154Id. (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991)). 
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of interests is still necessary.  The primary question then became whether to use the 
standard of  “strict” or “intermediate” scrutiny.155 
Finding intermediate scrutiny applicable, the court considered two arguments 
posed by the government.156  The first argument attempted to classify the defendant’s 
actions as “expressive conduct” rather than “pure speech,” thus justifying its evasion 
of strict First Amendment scrutiny.157  So categorized, the conduct would fall under 
intermediate scrutiny analysis as expressed in United States v. O’Brien.158  In that 
case, the Court reasoned that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ [sic] elements are 
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental 
interest in regulating the nonspeech [sic] elements can justify incidental limitations 
on First Amendment freedoms.”159  Rejecting this argument, the Bartnicki court 
found that the acts of “disclosing” and “publishing” constitute speech and not 
expressive conduct, thus invalidating the government’s intermediate scrutiny 
argument.160 
The court did accept the government’s second argument favoring the use of 
intermediate scrutiny based on “content-neutral” regulation.161  Citing Clark v. 
Community for Creative Non-Violence,162 the court recognized that such restrictions 
are valid provided they “are [1] justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, [2] that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and [3] that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of information.”163  Such a determination, however, is only half the 
battle.  In balancing state interests (defined by the purpose of the law) against First 
Amendment concerns, the court ultimately determined that (1) the manner in which 
the government claimed the statute serves its interests is too “indirect” to justify 
suppression,164 and (2) the statute is not sufficiently narrow to accomplish state 
interests without unnecessarily interfering with the First Amendment.165  
Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the statute in question violated the First 
Amendment.166 
Dissenting in Bartnicki, Judge Pollak voiced disagreement only with the 
majority’s application of intermediate scrutiny.167  Feeling the “state’s interests” and 
                                                                
155Id. at 119. 
156Id. 
157Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 119. 
158391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
159Id. at 376. 
160Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 120-21. 
161Id. at 121. 
162468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
163Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 121. 
164Id. at 126. 
165See id. 
166Id. at 129. 
167Id. at 130. 
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the “prohibition on third-party disclosures” to be substantially related, he reasoned 
that “[u]nless disclosure is prohibited, there will be an incentive for illegal 
interceptions [and] . . . the damage caused . . . will be compounded.”168  He also 
recognized the substantial state legislative support (distinguishing Landmark) as 
evidence of widespread support for limited suppression of disclosure.169 
B.  State of the Law in the 3rd Circuit – Boehner v. McDermott 
In December of 1996 John Boehner, a plaintiff and a member of the House of 
Representatives, participated in a conference call with several other high-ranking 
Republicans regarding their strategy in response to an expected announcement by the 
Ethic’s Subcommittee that had been preparing to investigate ethics violations of 
then-Speaker Newt Gingrich.170  Boehner’s participation in the call occurred from his 
cell phone while driving through northern Florida.171  Two Florida residents, using a 
radio scanner, intercepted and recorded the conversation.172  At the recommendation 
of local Democrats, the couple delivered the recording to Representative James 
McDermott, the defendant and ranking Democratic member of the House Ethics 
Committee, along with a letter indicating how the conversation had been 
intercepted.173  Subsequently, McDermott gave copies to three national media 
sources that, in turn, published the “highly public [and] significant” information.174 
Following publication of the stories, the Florida couple was prosecuted under the 
criminal provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act.175  One year later, Boehner filed a 
civil action against McDermott pursuant to § 2520 claiming McDermott had violated 
§ 2511(1)(c).176  McDermott successfully moved to dismiss, claiming the statute 
violated his First Amendment right against punishment for publication of truthful 
and lawfully obtained information of public significance.177  Boehner then appealed 
to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.178 
In reversing the trial court’s findings with regard to the First Amendment, Judge 
Randolph, in an extremely logical and well-reasoned opinion, began by simply 
                                                                
168Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 133. 
169Calling into question the wisdom behind the majority’s decision, Judge Pollak pointed 
out that the decision “spells the demise of a portion of more than twenty other state statutes.”  
Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 134. 




174This information was publicly and politically significant because Speaker Gingrich had 
agreed not to strategize regarding the possible investigation by the House Ethics Committee.  
This conversation indicated conduct that possibly violated that agreement.  See id. 
175See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a) (2002), 2511(4)(b)(ii) (2002). 
176See supra Section I for text of statutes. 
177See Boehner, 191 F.3d at 466. 
178See id. at 463. 
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challenging McDermott’s claim that his actions even amounted to “speech.”179  
McDermott had claimed “this [to be] core political speech [lying] at the very heart of 
the First Amendment.”180  The court did not agree and noted that “the tape [did] . . . 
contain speech about political matters . . . [b]ut the speech is not McDermott’s and 
§ 2511(1)(c) does not render him liable for anything anyone said on the recording.  
[I]t is his conduct in delivering the tape that gives rise to his potential liability.”181  
Recognizing the possibility of “communicative elements” in his actions, the court 
concluded that the “O’Brien framework is the proper mode of First Amendment 
analysis.”182  Recall that the O’Brien analysis applies to generally applicable laws 
containing content-neutral prohibitions that create incidental burdens on speech.183 It 
holds that such prohibitions are justified if they further “an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression; and if the . . . restriction . . . is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.”184 
Ultimately finding the state’s interest to be “substantial,” the court reasoned that 
the provisions of the statute actually promote free speech rather than detract from 
it.185  By failing to insulate the discloser from liability, others may feel free to speak 
candidly.186  Absent such a law, it is conceivable that people would refrain from 
readily speaking their minds for fear that their conversation is not “private.”187  
Justification was also found in the deterrent effect the statute arguably provides.188  
Likening the recorded interception to stolen property, the court compared the statute 
in question to laws prohibiting the receipt of stolen goods.189  Deterrence of the 
original offense as the common motivation, the court held such an interest as 
satisfying the O’Brien test.190 
Rejecting McDermott’s contention that his “lawful” acquisition of the 
information placed him under the protection of the rule set forth in Florida Star, the 
court distinguished the two cases by noting that the respective statutes differed in 
scope, purpose, and content.191  More significantly, however, the court analyzed a 
                                                                
179Id. at 466. 
180Id. 
181Id. at 466-67. 
182Boehner, 191 F.3d at 467; see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
183Boehner, 191 F.3d at 467. 
184Id. at 468. 
185Recognizing that the interception of a conversation violates the “freedom not to speak 
publicly,” the court concluded that laws prohibiting such conduct, in fact, bolster free speech.  
Id. at 469. 
186See id. at 470. 
187Id. at 468. 
188Boehner, 191 F.3d at 468-69. 
189Id. at 469-70. 
190Id. 
191See id. at 471-72. 
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footnote provided by the Court in Florida Star.  In relevant part, the footnote stated 
that “the Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where 
information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, [the] 
government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing 
publication as well.”192  The court went on to reason that “regardless whether the 
illegality is committed by a newspaper’s reporter or by a source, if the newspaper 
publishes the illegally obtained information, the First Amendment may not shield it 
from punishment.”193  This directly opposed McDermott’s argument that his 
“innocent” involvement protected him from liability.194  According to the court, he 
was anything but “innocent.”195  The fact that the Florida couple sought immunity in 
return for disclosing the tape implies that McDermott, or someone speaking on his 
behalf, led them to believe it could be granted.196  Such conduct amounts, at least, to 
participation.197 
Citing various cases demonstrating instances in which suppression has been 
upheld based on a duty of confidentiality,198 the court noted that a similar “duty” 
arose from § 2511(1)(c) of the Federal Wiretap Act.199  McDermott obtained the 
information under the duty of nondisclosure imposed by the statute.200  In short, the 
Boehner court found ample “state interests” to justify suppression of this 
information, ever mindful of the possibility that McDermott’s “disclosure” may not 
even amount to “speech” protected under the First Amendment.201  Accordingly, the 
D.C. Circuit has held the statute in question to be constitutional and not a violation of 
the First Amendment.202 
V.  WHO’S RIGHT – A SUGGESTION FOR THE SUPREME COURT 
Like many cases that come before the Supreme Court, this one presents an 
extremely difficult question in that the opposing arguments are each grounded upon 
constitutional principles that most, if not all, Americans consider fundamental.  
Mindful of the First Amendment’s history203 and its evolution to its present day 
                                                                
192Id. at 472 (citing The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535). 
193Boehner, 191 F.3d at 473. 




198Boehner, 191 F.3d at 476. 
199Id. at 477. 
200Id. 
201Id. 
202Id. at 478. 
203The freedom of speech and press in the United States had its origins in the common law 
tradition of England.  However, at the time of its inception (shortly after the Constitutional 
Convention in 1791) it was not clear as to the extent to which “free speech” should reach.  In 
England, the freedom to speak and publish as one desired did exist; however, its limitations 
arose from its failure to protect the speaker/publisher from state action after the fact.  
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pinnacle as a quintessential symbol of freedom, many advocates of free speech argue 
that the slightest submission on their part to the State may serve as the slippery slope 
that will result in suppression of the Freedom of Speech.  On the other hand, should 
advocacy of the right to speak come at the expense of yet another constitutionally 
protected right – privacy?  Is not privacy a right most people consider paramount?  
After all, it is fairly safe to assume that the average citizen is more likely to fall into 
the category of people using cell phones (like Representative Boehner or Gloria 
Bartnicki) than the category of people intercepting phone conversations.  It would 
stand to reason, then, that most would relate more readily to the privacy interest, 
rather than the free speech interest.    
These assumptions, whether right or wrong, are not alone sufficient to resolve the 
conflict.  They only attempt to illustrate the possible impression the general public 
may have with regard to this clash of constitutional norms.  Ultimately, resolution of 
such conflicts must flow from the logical analysis of constitutional precedent and the 
rule of law upon which the rights in question are grounded.  Accordingly, while 
emotional arguments may appear persuasive, this Note will base its conclusion 
primarily on the rule of law as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
Which of these rights, then, if any, transcends the other?  Under what 
circumstances, if ever, might one take precedent over the other?  Due to the broad 
number of arguments and cases supporting, in whole or in part, the many views in 
favor of both “privacy” and “free speech,” it is with deliberate caution that this Note 
will address only a few of them to demonstrate why privacy should supercede free 
speech in this situation.  It would be impractical to address each and every tangential 
argument posed by advocates on either side, while attempting to maintain focus on 
the basic constitutional question involved.  That question being, in its simplest form, 
whether the privacy interests held by a participant in a phone conversation outweigh 
the free speech interests (with respect to disclosure) held by a third party who has 
been given an illegally (pursuant to the Federal Wiretap Act) obtained recording of 
the phone conversation.  This section will proffer a solution in favor of the right to 
privacy while attempting to sufficiently honor the First Amendment’s right to Free 
Speech. 
A.  The Constitutional Right to Privacy 
As distinguished from the First Amendment’s guarantee of Free Speech, the right 
to privacy is nowhere mentioned in the text of the constitution.  Even the youngest 
school child probably knows that all Americans presently enjoy such a right.  If, 
however, such a right exists but is not directly contained within the text of the 
constitution, from where, then, does it derive its legitimacy?  Furthermore, if 
legitimate, must such a non-textual right automatically be pre-empted by a right like 
Free Speech that clearly appears in the constitutional text? 
                                                          
Therefore, the citizenry were protected only from “prior restraint” by the state.  While the 
government could not stop a person from speaking, it was perfectly legal to later punish the 
speaker for what was said.  The Framers wrote the First Amendment in this context, never 
really distinguishing it from its English counterpart.  See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING—CASES AND MATERIALS 61 (Aspen Law & Business 
2000). 
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It has been said that Americans, in general, favor the right to privacy far more 
than their European ancestors.  Darien McWhirter and Jon Bible illustrate this 
phenomenon in the following example: 
After the United States purchased the territory of Louisiana thousands of 
people from Kentucky floated down the Mississippi river to take up 
residence in New Orleans.  These supposedly primitive Kentucky people 
were appalled by the architecture they encountered.  The homes required 
people to walk through a bedroom to get to a living room, and in many 
cases the stairways joining sleeping and living quarters were outside the 
houses for everyone to see!  The new Americans soon built homes with 
hallways and indoor stairways, even though by European standards such 
things were considered a waste of indoor space. 
Other examples abound.  Americans excelled at building fences and 
invented both barbed wire and chain link.  When railroads became popular 
it was an American who came up with the private Pullman compartment.  
In America, even the cheapest motel provides each room with a “private” 
bathroom; indeed, many Americans consider the lack of such “private” 
facilities the worst part of travel in Europe.  When Americans felt they 
could not get enough privacy in either small towns or cities, they invented 
suburbs.  In short, Americans have a significant concern with privacy and 
in many cases have made sacrifices to satisfy this desire to “be let 
alone.”204 
Such examples raise the question as to why such a right was not explicitly 
granted.  Alternatively, however, such a seemingly gross “oversight” on the part of 
the framers may indicate their acceptance of such a right as inherent and in need of 
no constitutional affirmation.  Judge Lambros, writing in United States v. Perkins,205 
recognized that judicial protection of privacy rights are becoming more necessary 
with modern technological advancements.  He wrote: 
The authors of the Constitution were perhaps not as concerned with the 
protection of this right as they should have been.  But there were so few in 
this vast land that expressed concern for protection of privacy [it] must 
have hardly seem justified.  Through the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 
however, all the protection needed was given; express delineation of a 
right to privacy was not, and is not necessary.206    
Nevertheless, its textual absence required the Supreme Court to justify its existence 
via originalist theories of constitutional interpretation. 
Justice Louis Brandeis is credited with bringing the privacy interest to the 
Court.207  Following his appointment by President Wilson in 1916, Brandeis became 
                                                                
204DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER  & JON D. BIBLE, PRIVACY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT – SEX, 
DRUGS AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE 9 (Quorum Books 1992). 
205383 F. Supp. 922, 926 (N.D. Ohio 1974). 
206Id. at 926. 
207See supra note 15. 
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the occupant of what would become known as the Court’s “privacy seat.”208  As 
distinguishable from prior Supreme Court Justices, Brandeis’ intent with regard to 
privacy was to establish its constitutional legitimacy.  However, as is the case in 
American jurisprudence, judicial activism can only occur when a “case or 
controversy” is brought before the Court.209  Accordingly, Brandeis’ agenda 
remained restrained until 1928 when the Court heard Olmstead v. United States.210  
As mentioned in Section I, Olmstead is primarily recognized for Brandeis’ rigorous 
dissent to the majority’s failure to honor privacy interests.211  Despite his efforts, 
though, Brandeis was unable to sway the Court to establish privacy as a 
constitutional right.   
Following Brandeis’ retirement, his replacement, William Douglas, continued to 
carry the torch while occupying the “privacy seat.”  Contrary to common occurrence, 
the incoming Justice shared the views of his outgoing counterpart.212  In 1965 Justice 
Douglas, writing for the majority in the seminal case of Griswold v. Connecticut,213 
finally established privacy as a constitutionally protected right.  In that case, the 
defendants had been convicted under a law that prohibited, among other things, the 
use of a contraceptive.214  Refusing to uphold the law in conformity with the Lochner 
line of precedent, the Court instead focused on the sacred institution of marriage in 
which the use of the contraceptive device took place.215  Considering the 
circumstances, the Court felt that legislative intrusion by the state into the bedroom 
of a married couple violated a more fundamental right than the right held by the state 
legislature to regulate in this area.  Finding no textual support in the Constitution, 
however, Douglas drew comparisons to peripheral rights accompanying various 
express rights granted under the Bill of Rights. 
For example, he reasoned, that the “association of people” and “the right to 
educate a child in a school of the parent’s choice” is nowhere found in the text of the 
Bill of Rights.216  Nevertheless, such rights have been sustained under the First 
Amendment as being peripherally implied.217  Accordingly, the First Amendment is 
said to have a “penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental 
intrusion.”218  Similar “penumbras,” or “zones of privacy,” were found to exist with 
                                                                
208See MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra note 204, at 91. 
209See U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
210277 U.S. 438 (1928).  Recall that Olmstead involved the tapping of phone lines without 
any actual trespass onto the suspect’s property. 
211See supra notes 13-15. 
212See MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra note 204, at 91. 
213381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
214See id. at 480 (referring to CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958 rev.)). 
215Id. at 481. 
216Id. at 482. 
217See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
218Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. 
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regard to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments as well.219  Accordingly, the 
Court concluded that the “right of privacy . . . is a legitimate one”220 and held that the 
law restricting the use of contraceptives violated the more sacred right of privacy as 
enjoyed within a marriage. 
Two years after Griswold the Court, in Katz v. United States,221 finally overturned 
Olmstead and adequately honored Brandeis’ dissent.  The years following Katz 
marked a turning point in privacy jurisprudence particularly in the area of criminal 
prosecutions.  The Fourth Amendment experienced heavy constitutional 
consideration with respect to the scope of the “search and seizure” provisions 
contained therein.  In any event, the efforts of Justices Brandeis and Douglas 
ultimately served to provide the American people with the constitutional right to 
privacy.  This right is now challenged by First Amendment jurisprudence. 
B.  A Threshold Question – Is this Speech? 
Obviously, the easiest way to evade a First Amendment challenge is to find that 
the activity a statute seeks to regulate is not “speech.”  While easy enough to assert, 
in practice such an undertaking may pose more problems than one might think.  In so 
doing, however, the first step is to define “speech.”  In its simplest form speech 
might be defined as any oral or written communication.  In fact, such a definition 
was the only one that had ever been contemplated, until, in Stromberg v. 
California,222 when the Court first considered a communicative action as speech 
protected under the First Amendment.  In that case a nineteen-year-old camp 
counselor was charged with the crime of “raising the red flag.”223  California had 
outlawed such conduct due to the red flag’s association with communism.224  Finding 
her actions to be “symbolic speech” the Court struck down the law finding the state’s 
interest in forbidding such conduct insufficient to justify suppression.225  Since 1931, 
the Court has continued to expand that which it considers protected “speech” to now 
include conduct as offensive as desecration of the American flag.226  Accordingly, 
conduct having any sort of communicative or symbolic aspect has an excellent 
chance of qualifying as “speech” under the First Amendment.227  However, such a 
broad definition should not serve to eliminate asking the threshold question – “is this 
speech?” 
                                                                
219See id. at 485. 
220Id. at 486. 
221389 U.S. 347 (1967).  See also supra Section I. 
222283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
223Id. 
224Id. 
225Id. at 535-36. 
226See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
227See, e.g., Stromberg and Texas v. Johnson, supra. 
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In fact, Judge Randolph, in Boehner v. McDermott,228 began his analysis by 
asking this very question.  Recall that McDermott, a Democratic politician, had 
received and disclosed a tape-recorded conversation that had been obtained in 
violation of the Federal Wiretap Act.229  The conversation involved information that 
would prove detrimental to Republican interests if made public.230  Upon receiving 
the tape, he passed it along to several media sources who, in turn, published its 
contents.231  His sole defense in the civil suit lodged against him was that he had a 
free speech right to do whatever he wished with the information.232  Randolph’s 
simple response was, “what speech?”233 
In reality, all McDermott did was act as the middle-man.  He received the 
information and passed it along to the next entity.  He neither added anything to it 
nor removed anything from it.  Accordingly, the disclosure of the illegally 
intercepted information did not, in and of itself, convey a view held by McDermott. 
How can it be said, then, that he attempted to express anything by his conduct?  This 
proves significant because the Court, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence,234 held that only “expressive” conduct is to be afforded First Amendment 
protection.  Expressive conduct had been determined to have a “communicative” 
aspect in that it attempts to convey a viewpoint of the speaker.235  Absent this 
communicative quality, conduct (even if in the form of spoken words) may not 
always warrant protection under the First Amendment.236  Perhaps the only way 
McDermott could have transmitted this information in a manner that clearly would 
have qualified as “speech” would have been to read it to the media rather than simply 
handing them the tape.237   
This particular set of facts serves as the primary distinction between the Boehner 
and Bartnicki cases.   While each case involves the same statute and the same 
circumstance involving the disclosure of an illegally obtained phone conversation, in 
Bartnicki one of the defendants is the media.  Curiously enough, no media defendant 
was named in Boehner despite involvement not unlike the media defendant in 
Bartnicki.  Nevertheless, the Boehner court refused to emphatically state how it 
would rule if a media defendant had been named.238 
                                                                
228191 F.3d 463 (1999). 
229See id. at 466.  The couple had intercepted the cell phone conversation in violation of 
the Federal Wiretap Act. 
230Id. at 465. 
231Id. 
232Id. at 466. 
233Boehner, 191 F.3d at 466. 
234468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984). 
235Id. 
236Id. at 294-95. 
237See Boehner, 191 F.3d at 467. 
238See id. at 471. 
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Since the Supreme Court has chosen to review Bartnicki rather than Boehner, 
undoubtedly due to media involvement, it is fair to assume that it will characterize 
the defendants’ activities as “speech.”  Perhaps appropriately so - for once 
information is disseminated “in print” it is much more difficult to say that “speech” 
has not occurred.  The question that arises is whether media involvement should 
greatly affect the analysis.  Nevertheless, it is extremely significant that the “speech” 
in question in both these cases is suspect.  It is not speech in the purest sense and, 
therefore, should not be treated as such. 
C.  A Prima Facia Case for the Constitutionality of the Federal Wiretap Act 
Simply because a statute seems to oppose free speech on its face does not, per se, 
mean that it will fall prey to a First Amendment challenge.  To believe so would be 
to hold that free speech is an absolute right.  In reality, very few rights, if any, enjoy 
complete autonomy from all government regulation.  Perhaps the most well known 
restriction on speech is the prohibition against shouting “fire” in a crowded theater 
and causing a panic.239  Basing its holding on the “clear and present” danger test, the 
Court has held that the result from such conduct justifies suppression.  Accordingly, 
not all speech is protected.   
Several Supreme Court decisions analogously demonstrate the inherent 
constitutional legitimacy of the Federal Wiretap Act.240  For example, in Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,241 the Court upheld laws prohibiting the 
disclosure of lawfully obtained trade secrets.  In Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation 
Enters,242 the Court authorized civil penalties against those who lawfully obtain but 
unlawfully publish copyrighted materials.  More importantly, though, the Court 
acknowledged “a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, which serves the same 
ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.”243  While it is true that 
these cases involve disclosure of information that was actively being protected by the 
law, it is important to note that the nature of the information was not necessarily 
“private.”  Accordingly, the personal and private nature of the information involved 
in cases like Bartnicki and Boehner should be considered even more sacred.   
Perhaps the best argument against the applicability of these cases is that in each 
situation there was a preexisting duty to keep silent.  Therefore, on their face, it 
would seem that this line of cases is distinguishable from Bartnicki.  As noted by the 
court in Boehner, however, the Federal Wiretap Act provided notice to the 
                                                                
239See, e.g., Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
240See generally In re Motion of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating 
that grand jurors who lawfully obtain knowledge of a witness’ testimony may not disclose the 
information); United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (prohibiting disclosure of 
information contained in lawfully obtained wiretaps); Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 
(1991) (enforcing a reporter’s promise to maintain the confidentiality of an informant); Seattle 
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 476 U.S. 20 (1984) (issuing a court order prohibiting disclosure of 
information obtained during discovery). 
241433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
242471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
243Id. at 559 (citing Est. of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 
(N.Y. 1968). 
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defendants that they had a statutorily imposed duty not to disclose the information.244  
How does the duty imposed by the statute differ from the duty imposed in the above 
cases?  It doesn’t.  The unauthorized publication of copyrighted materials is far less 
intrusive than publication of the contents of a private phone conversation.  Logically, 
then, it should be exponentially easier to justify civil penalties for publication of the 
latter in light of the Court’s willingness to uphold laws prohibiting the former.   
Accordingly, congressional suppression of the type of “speech” found in the 
Bartnicki case should not necessarily offend the First Amendment.  Perhaps, the 
manner in which the case arrived in court provides free speech advocates with the 
necessary zeal to oppose the Federal Wiretap Act.245  This is only to say that 
suppressing the media, as opposed to merely a private individual, tends to raise the 
eyebrows of First Amendment advocates more quickly.246  Additionally, the fact that 
the information involved in Bartnicki could be classified as “publicly significant” 
may serve to fan the First Amendment flame.  Nevertheless, it is the privacy interest 
that should serve as the focal point of this dispute.  It is a constitutional right equally 
deserving of protection.  Free “speech” is not and has never been considered an 
impenetrable fortress.  As the aforementioned cases demonstrate, its walls have been 
conquered in many different contexts, the least significant of which pales in 
comparison to the basic right to privacy in one’s personal phone communications. 
D.  First Amendment Scrutiny – What Standard Applies? 
Perhaps the more persuasive argument in favor of privacy lies not in the logical 
consideration of prior cases permitting various types of suppression, but in the 
constitutional precedents that focus on the scope and intent of the suppression a 
statute seeks to achieve.  Recognizing that suppression is sometimes permissible, the 
Court has provided guidelines by which Congress, via legislation, may inadvertently 
restrict the dissemination of information.247  The key element, though, is 
“inadvertency.”  Once it is determined that the legislative intent is to specifically 
restrict speech (meaning its content), the most exacting scrutiny is applied by the 
Court when evaluating the constitutionality of the legislation.248  Such scrutiny, 
generally referred to as “strict scrutiny,” holds that suppression cannot take place 
unless it “is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly 
drawn to achieve that end.”249  While it is possible to satisfy such a high standard, 
imposition of strict scrutiny analysis generally spells the demise of the statute against 
which it is imposed. 
                                                                
244Boehner, 191 F.3d at 477. 
245See Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 113 (the intercepted information was broadcast on radio and 
television). 
246Note however that the Supreme Court has generally held that the press does not have 
greater First Amendment rights than an average citizen.  See generally First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734 (1975); 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964);  
247See generally, United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
248Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
249Id. (quoting Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educator’s Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983)). 
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As illustrated by Florida Star and its progeny, this standard is extremely difficult 
to satisfy.  Fortunately, it is not applicable here.  Rather, a less restrictive level of 
scrutiny, “intermediate scrutiny,” is applicable in the Bartnicki case.  Intermediate 
scrutiny is appropriate when a statute can be characterized as a “law of general 
applicability” or a “content-neutral law” – both of which describe the Federal 
Wiretap Act.  However, before discussing the justification for and the applicability 
of “intermediate scrutiny,” it is important to specifically understand why the “strict 
scrutiny” analysis of Florida Star and Daily Mail does not apply to the Bartnicki 
case. 
Recall for a moment the line of cases described in Section II whose holdings bore 
the general theme that lawfully obtained information could not be suppressed by the 
state.250  In those cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny analysis to strike down each 
of the laws restricting publication of certain information.  Accordingly, a limited 
reading of those cases would suggest that the statute now in question should meet a 
similar end.  However, several points of contention distinguish those cases from 
Bartnicki.   
First, none of the cases in Section II dealt with information that was obtained in 
an improper manner.  In each case, the information was gathered either through 
creative reporting or through some other legal method of newsgathering.  
Conversely, the information in Bartnicki was undoubtedly acquired, at least initially, 
illegally.  This simple fact alone places Bartnicki well outside the scope of these 
cases.  It is true that the defendants in Bartnicki could argue that their failure to 
participate in the actual act of interception makes their acquisition of the information 
“lawful.”  However, § 2511(c)’s “knowing or having reason to know” provision 
places an onus of accountability on the defendants that may well characterize their 
acquisition as “unlawful.”  While such a determination is ultimately for the finder of 
fact, the possibility of its presence amply serves to distinguish the facts in Bartnicki. 
Secondly, each of the aforementioned cases either involved statutes that regulated 
the specific subject of the speech or dealt with information that had already entered 
the public domain.251  Obviously, the information contained in the recording that Mr. 
Yocum gave to the media had not yet entered the public domain.  More significantly, 
though, as will be discussed below, the Federal Wiretap Act does not make 
restrictions based on the content or subject matter of the speech involved.  It is 
completely content-neutral and, thus, distinguishable from the laws these cases 
struck down. 
Finally, and probably most importantly, the Court, in each of the aforementioned 
cases, expressly limited its holdings to the specific facts of each case.252  Recognizing 
                                                                
250See generally Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1991); The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 
491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Landmark 
Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. District Court, 
430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975);  
251See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (prohibiting publication of 
identity of victims of sexual offenses); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98 (1979) 
(prohibiting publication of juvenile offender’s identity); Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. District 
Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (prohibiting publication of juvenile’s identity who had been 
charged with crime); Cox Broad. Corp., v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471 (1975) (prohibiting 
publication of rape victim’s identity). 
252Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 117. 
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the Court’s refusal to state broad-based rules, the Bartnicki court noted that such 
conduct “strongly suggests that a rule for undecided cases should not be derived by 
negative implication from [these] reported decisions.”253  In fact, the Florida Star 
Court stated that “to the extent sensitive information rests in private hands, the 
government may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual acquisition, 
thereby bringing outside of the Daily Mail principle the publication of any 
information so acquired.”254  Such assertions make clear the Court’s belief that 
properly drafted legislation may permissibly restrict speech.  Consequently, 
Bartnicki is not governed by these cases and strict scrutiny is not the applicable 
standard. 
Rather, intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review when 
analyzing the civil provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act.  Attempting to define 
“intermediate,” the Bartnicki court commented that it “varies to some extent from 
context to context . . . [b]ut it always encompasses some balancing of the state 
interest and the means used to effectuate that interest.”255  In effect, the sufficiency of 
the “state interest” is reduced from “compelling” to some lesser standard - perhaps 
“substantial.”  Dispelling the rationale for the imposition of strict scrutiny, however, 
is not alone sufficient to find intermediate scrutiny applicable.  Independent 
justification must arise based either on the facts of the case or the manner in which 
the statute in question seeks to regulate.   
Congress’ intent, with respect to the disclosure provisions of the Federal Wiretap 
Act, was not to suppress “speech” per se, but, rather, to preserve the privacy rights of 
the citizenry as technological advancements were making it easier to impinge upon 
another’s private life.256  Furthermore, the Act’s restrictions are not applicable 
against a limited class as were several of the statues in the Florida Star line of cases.  
Accordingly, the provisions in question can be characterized both as “generally 
applicable” and “content-neutral.”  These categorizations provide two justifications 
for the use of the intermediate scrutiny standard in the Bartnicki case. 
1.  Generally Applicable Laws 
Laws of general applicability are simply laws that apply with equal force against 
everyone without, in this case, any specific relation to suppression of speech.  
Perhaps the best example was illustrated in Cohen v. Cowles Media, in Section II, 
where the Court held a newspaper liable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
for breaking a confidentiality agreement it made with a source who wished to remain 
anonymous.  The newspaper’s First Amendment defense failed in that case because 
the doctrine upon which the plaintiff sought recovery was a “generally applicable” 
                                                                
253Id. 
254The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534 
255Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 124.  Interestingly enough, the Bartnicki court agrees that 
“intermediate scrutiny” is the proper standard of review for the Federal Wiretap Act.  
However, it bases its conclusion only on the fact the law qualifies as “content neutral” and 
“generally applicable,” thus ignoring a third justification based on the reasoning of O’Brien.  
See id. at 123. 
256Notice that the Act prohibits many different uses of illegally obtained information.  See 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2511 (1)(c), 2511(1)(d). 
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law whose operation was not intended to act as a regulation on communicative 
actions.  Promissory estoppel, in that case, had nothing to do with suppressing 
speech, yet it still managed to have an incidental effect on the newspaper’s ability to 
divulge the identity of its source.  Accordingly, the Court held that “generally 
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their 
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report 
the news.”257  More importantly, however, the Court affirmed its prior holding that 
“the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of 
general laws.  He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of 
others.”258  Therefore, the presence of a media defendant in the Bartnicki case should 
not affect the Court’s analysis.  Clearly, the Cohen Court refused to insulate the 
media from the same scrutiny that would apply against any other individual. 
The Federal Wiretap Act’s disclosure provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(c) and 
(d), qualify as “generally applicable” because their prohibitions against the 
disclosure of illegally obtained information do not single out speech for special 
prohibition; rather, they regulate speech based on the manner in which it was 
acquired.  They are based on punishing the conduct that produces the speech.  
Therefore, the incidental burden on speech is merely a byproduct of the conduct the 
statutes seek to regulate.  Accordingly, these statutes are generally applicable laws 
falling under the purview of Cohen and intermediate scrutiny applies. 
2.  Content-Neutral Laws 
Content-neutral laws regulate evenly across the board regardless of the content or 
subject of the speech in question.  The focus, with respect to the disclosure 
provisions, is more on the manner in which the information is presented or the 
manner in which it was acquired, rather than the actual content of the disclosure 
itself.  The statutes make no reference to any particular type of speech, nor are they 
focused upon any class of speakers.  As briefly mentioned earlier, this serves as one 
of the primary distinctions between the Federal Wiretap Act and the laws struck 
down in the Florida Star line of cases.  In each of those cases, the laws in question 
regulated either a particular type of speech or a particular type of speaker.  Such laws 
have been deemed “content-based” because they impose restrictions based on 
“particular viewpoints” or particular “subject matter.”259 
The Court, in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,260 unanimously held that 
intermediate scrutiny applied to an order prohibiting disclosure of information 
obtained during discovery.  The Court went on to note that the same information 
could have been disclosed “as long as [it was] gained through [other] means.”261  The 
focus of the prohibition was not on the speech, but upon the manner in which it was 
                                                                
257Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669. 
258Id. at 670. (citing Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)). 
259Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980).  Justice 
Souter, concurring in Hill v. Colorado, indicated that strict scrutiny applies if a law 
“suppress[es] discussion of a subject of a point of view.”  530 U.S. 703, 735 (2000) (Souter, J., 
concur). 
260467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984). 
261Id. 
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obtained.  In other words, the civil discovery process was being protected at the 
incidental expense of free speech.  Similarly, the disclosure provisions of the Federal 
Wiretap Act care little as to the content of the speech regulated.  The primary 
concern is to discourage the interception of private communication, regardless of the 
type of communication.  Therefore, the Act is a content-neutral law and intermediate 
scrutiny applies. 
E.  Intermediate Scrutiny as Applied to the Federal Wiretap Act 
Obviously, application of the intermediate scrutiny standard does not, however, 
guarantee a finding that a statute is constitutional.262  In fact, the Bartnicki court, 
which actually decided to apply intermediate scrutiny, spoke to this effect by citing 
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim.263  In that 
case, Blackmun clearly indicated that the government’s burden “to articulate, and 
support, a reasoned and significant basis” was not a task to be taken lightly.264  While 
his intentions were probably to remind Congress of its limitations, it should not serve 
to raise the intermediate scrutiny standard beyond the definition the Court has 
expressly provided.  Nevertheless, the majority in Bartnicki concluded that the 
government interest sought to be protected by the Federal Wiretap Act is insufficient 
to justify its incidental effect on the First Amendment, thus holding the statute 
unconstitutional.265  This conclusion represents an incorrect balancing of the interests 
involved and should be reversed by the United States Supreme Court. 
The balancing test to be applied under intermediate scrutiny evaluates the statute 
to see if “it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest . . . [which] is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression . . . and [whose application’s] 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”266  The civil provisions of the Federal 
Wiretap Act satisfy this test. 
1.  The Substantial Governmental Interest 
Typically, a pure “governmental interest” involves somewhat of a self-serving 
governmental concern, legitimate or otherwise, sought to enable more effective 
control over a state or the nation.  Admittedly, this assertion is an overgeneralization, 
but it would be fair to conclude that it may embody the average citizen’s perception 
of what a “governmental interest” may be.  It is important to note, however, that the 
“governmental interest” with respect to the Federal Wiretap Act might more 
appropriately be termed a “citizen’s interest” in that the disclosure provisions seek 
not to protect the government, but to protect the privacy of the citizenry.  Generally 
speaking, then, the interests can be identified as the “constitutionally protected right 
to privacy.”  Therefore, the interest’s potency should be enhanced due to its genuine 
public aim and its established constitutional legitimacy. 
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263452 U.S. 61, 77 (1981). 
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265Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129. 
266United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
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As mentioned in Section I, Congress’ purpose in passing the Federal Wiretap 
Act, as amended, was to protect privacy interests with respect to wire, oral and 
electronic communications.  Uncontested provisions of the Act include general 
prohibitions against the interception of such communications absent a warrant or 
some other form of appropriate justification.267  Of course, these provisions are 
hailed as the “protectors of privacy” and the “watchdogs of liberty” in a world of 
modern technology where average citizens engage in high-tech, “James Bond-like” 
activities.  What follows, however, is that general prohibitions on interception alone, 
while good, will not effectively guard the interests the Act intends to protect. Absent 
a prohibition on disclosure, an individual’s privacy may still be violated – only at a 
later point in time, and possibly by a different person.  Accordingly, by prohibiting 
disclosure of information obtained in violation of the Act, one of the incentives to 
intercept in the first place is greatly reduced.  In other words, without the prohibition 
on disclosure, the Act’s ability to achieve its ultimate goal is without proper support.   
As evidenced by the Framers’ Fourth Amendment prohibitions against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, a citizen’s expectation of privacy was, and 
remains, a paramount concern.  Recalling the Supreme Court’s progression from 
Olmstead to Katz, in Section I, the Court’s recognition of the “threat” of 
technological advancement becomes apparent.  It follows, then, that the Federal 
Wiretap Act’s attempt to further protect private communications, both by expanding 
to meet the circumstances of the times (such as cellular phones and the like) and by 
reducing the incentive to intercept (via the disclosure provisions), is merely the 
logical extension of the Framers’ intent.  Whether one agrees with the extent of this 
assertion or not, the fact of the matter is that privacy is a “substantial governmental 
(citizen) interest.” 
2.  Interest is Unrelated to Suppression of Free Expression 
By its very definition, a “content-neutral” law bears no interest to the suppression 
of free speech.268  Once an interest to that effect arises, the law is reclassified and 
exposed to the strict scrutiny standard mentioned previously.  Having already 
defined the Federal Wiretap Act as a content-neutral law, this portion of the 
intermediate scrutiny test is per se satisfied.  However, because additional arguments 
exist to bolster the position, they will be briefly discussed. 
The language of § 2511(c), one of the sections in dispute, provides what is 
perhaps the best evidence that no direct attempt to regulate speech exists.  While it 
does effectively seal the lips of those in possession of illegally obtained information, 
it does so based not on the information they hold, but based on the manner in which 
it was obtained.  Again, this speaks directly to the content-neutrality of the provision.  
More so, however, it indicates that the intent of the law is to protect the privacy of 
the recorded speaker rather than to restrict the speech of the information holder.  Of 
course, speech is incidentally burdened.  To hold otherwise would be to place one’s 
head in the sand.  However, as previously discussed, speech is not an absolute right 
and may be incidentally burdened under proper circumstances. 
                                                                
26718 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)-(b) (2000). 
268O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 375. 
32https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss4/6
2001] THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY OF THE CIVIL PROVISIONS 715 
 
The Court in United States v. Nixon,269 stated that “human experience teaches that 
those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with 
a concern for appearances and for their own interests.”270  What First Amendment 
advocates fail to realize is that allowing disclosure may result in greater suppression 
of speech than prohibiting disclosure.  As the Nixon Court so eloquently explained, if 
private conversations are not protected from broad distribution it stands to reason 
that people will speak less freely.271  Therefore, to hold the disclosure provisions 
unconstitutional may well do more harm to the First Amendment than would 
otherwise occur.  Nevertheless, the fact that the provisions arguably enhance speech 
rather than detract from it serves as strong evidence of their non-suppressive intent.  
Conversely, one might argue that upholding the disclosure provisions of the Act 
will result in a “chilling effect” on speech because the press will be fearful of 
potential liability connected with “suspect” information.  While such a contention 
seems valid on its face, further consideration reveals that it is without merit.  The 
media has always considered accuracy a priority when reporting information.  In so 
doing, particular media sources establish integrity and reliability in the eyes of the 
public.  Accordingly, information received by news sources is not simply received 
and then quickly put into print in an ad hoc fashion.  During the fact checking 
process it is fair to assume that a reporter would be made aware of or “have reason to 
know” that given information may have come from an illegal interception.  If not, 
then liability is removed from the equation under the very language of the provisions 
themselves.  Remember, this requirement does not impose a duty to learn.  It only 
imposes liability based on knowledge at the time of acquisition.  Therefore, it is not 
likely that a truly innocent media source will be held liable if sued for disclosure.  
Accordingly, the “chilling effect” argument is void of merit and should not factor 
into the Court’s analysis. 
3.  Incidental Restrictions are Minimal 
The third prong of the O’Brien test demands that the government intrusion, albeit 
incidental, be limited in scope so as not to intrude upon First Amendment freedoms 
more than necessary.  Such a requirement bears analytical merit because it foresees 
the possibility of inappropriate encroachments that cleverly drafted legislation may 
achieve under the guise of content-neutrality.  Perhaps the best way to apply this 
prong of the test is not to evaluate the scope of the statute’s First Amendment 
restrictions, but, rather, attempt to identify a lesser intrusive manner (with respect to 
the First Amendment) under which the statute’s goals might still be achieved.  
Should a lesser means of encroachment exist, the statute may fail this prong of the 
test.  Note, however, that Supreme Court precedent has not required a regulation to 
be the absolute least speech-restrictive measure of advancing the state’s interest.272  It 
need only be shown that the state’s interest is less likely to be achieved absent the 
regulation.273 
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As has been cited numerous times, the purpose of the Federal Wiretap Act is to 
preserve the confidentiality of private oral, wire, or electronic communications.  To 
effectively accomplish this goal, restrictions cannot rest solely on the interceptive act 
alone.  To do so would enable the interceptor to merely pass along the fruits of his 
labor to a third party who could evade liability under the cover of statutory silence.  
While civil liability and criminal prosecution may well occur with respect to the 
interceptor, such results minimally contribute to the ultimate end the statute seeks to 
attain. 
Understandably, when information of public significance comes to light, 
regardless of how it was obtained, the general reaction is that suppression should not 
occur.  This begs the question as to why the statute could not be written to exclude 
liability when the intercepted information is of “public significance.”  Beyond the 
obvious problem of defining “publicly significant information” on a case-by-case 
basis lies the larger problem of transforming the statue from “content-neutral” to 
“content-based.”  As has been demonstrated in this Note, to base the government’s 
ability to suppress speech on the subject of the information would reclassify the 
statute in a manner that would require strict First Amendment scrutiny.  Under such 
circumstances it is almost certain that the statute would fail and possibly be removed 
from achieving its goal.  Accordingly, such an alternative method of statutory 
construction is unacceptable. 
Yet another possibility is to carve out a media exception that would hold the 
press to a different standard of review than the general public.  To do so would 
alleviate First Amendment concerns significantly because the press is the primary 
vehicle through which Free Speech rights are exercised.  This alternative, however, 
faces two primary obstacles.  First, suppression, or lack of its enforcement, based on 
the speaker’s identity comes dangerously close to qualifying a statute as a content-
based regulation.  For the same reasons that subject-oriented restrictions require 
heightened scrutiny, providing a special privilege for a certain entity, while 
maintaining suppressive control over others, demands the same level of First 
Amendment scrutiny.  Secondly, and more tangibly, the Court, as cited in Bohner v. 
McDermott, has held on numerous occasions that the press has no greater First 
Amendment protection than any other individual.  Accordingly, based on logic as 
well as precedent, to judicially rewrite the statute so as to enable the media to evade 
civil liability for disclosure of illegally intercepted information would not be 
appropriate. 
While other options may exist, the aforementioned fairly represent the type of 
alternative restrictive measures that First Amendment advocates might argue are 
best.  If they are right then the statute may fail the third prong of the O’Brien 
analysis.  However, as was demonstrated, each alternative is fatally flawed in that 
each fails to advance the ultimate goal the drafters of the statute intended – Privacy.  
The civil provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act strike an appropriate balance 
between objective based restrictions and adequate punitive measures.  Accordingly, 
they are sufficiently narrow so as not to unnecessarily impinge upon the First 
Amendment. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Often times, it is easy to predict how the Court will rule on a given issue due to 
the known ideological positions of its members.  Generally, the first step in such a 
prediction involves a simple identification of the issue itself with respect to its liberal 
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or conservative moorings.  Unlike many cases, however, Bartnicki v. Vopper 
presents a novel question arising from the collision of two fundamentally protected 
rights.  Rights, incidentally, whose proponents fall on both sides of the political and 
ideological spectrum.  It is important to recognize that support for one interest over 
the other does not necessarily represent a categorical denial of the latter right’s 
significance or constitutional legitimacy.  People, including judges, regularly 
advocate on behalf of free speech and privacy simultaneously, all the while believing 
that their subscription to both is not hypocritical.  Accordingly, it is completely 
understandable, while seemingly illogical, that various Justices may ardently support 
both rights despite their present opposition in this case.   
As was mentioned at the outset, co-existence of these two seminal rights, unless 
carefully defined, does seem improbable.  However, the requisite definition, as has 
been demonstrated, flows from the proper application of intermediate scrutiny via 
the O’Brien analysis.  No right is absolute.  Even the most important right of all, life, 
may be taken so long as due process is afforded.  So is the case with speech.  In no 
way did Congress intend to suppress information beyond that which was absolutely 
necessary to meet the privacy objectives the statute was enacted to protect.  This 
statute is clearly content-neutral and should survive First Amendment scrutiny so as 
to provide the citizenry with the statutory assurance that their most intimate and 
private communications will be zealously protected.  To hold otherwise will only 
discourage the candid and spontaneous expression free speech advocates so typically 
fight to protect.  Therefore, it is in the best interests of both constitutional rights to 
uphold the statute and reverse the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in the case 
of Bartnicki v. Vopper. 
VII.  EPILOGUE 
As mentioned in Footnote 11, authorship of this Note pre-dated the Supreme 
Court’s decision in the Bartnicki case.  Publication, however, will significantly post-
date the Court’s decision due to the lengthiness of the publication process.  
Accordingly, this section provides a brief synopsis of the Court’s decision in 
Bartnicki. 
On May 21, 2001, in a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Stevens (concurrence by 
Breyer, joined by O’Conner), the United States Supreme Court decided Bartnicki v. 
Vopper,274 affirming the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Bartnicki v. 
Vopper.275  In sum, the majority determined that the civil provisions of the Federal 
Wiretap Act violated the First Amendment. In other words, Congress’ good faith 
attempt to protect the public’s privacy rights by prohibiting third-party disclosure of 
information gained in violation of federal wiretapping laws, according to the 
majority, ran afoul of the First Amendment rights of the third-party discloser. 
Justice Steven’s opinion presented no real surprises with respect to its analytical 
approach.  It began with three factual assumptions, the last of which undoubtedly 
played a critical role in the Court’s decision:  (1) that respondents played no part in 
the illegal interception, (2) that their access to the information on the tapes was 
obtained lawfully, and (3) that the subject matter of the conversations on the tapes 
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was a matter of public concern.276  It then correctly characterized the statutes as 
content-neutral laws of general applicability, thereby reducing the level of 
constitutional scrutiny to be applied.277  Next, however, it determined that the statue’s 
“naked prohibition” against disclosure of illegally intercepted information, a 
characterization which may be somewhat overreaching in light of the statue’s 
“knowing” requirements, constituted a clear regulation of pure speech.278  Having 
determined that the respondents’ conduct qualified as the very type of speech the 
First Amendment seeks to protect, the Court surprisingly required that governmental 
interests of the “highest order” be present in order to justify the statutes restriction on 
speech.279 
In short, the Court recognized that the statutes clearly qualified as content-neutral 
laws; but, nevertheless, found a way to raise the “governmental interests” prong of 
the intermediate scrutiny test to the highest level, so as to justify its finding of their 
insufficiency.  Essentially, the majority identified the proper standard (intermediate 
scrutiny), but applied the improper standard (strict scrutiny), a point overtly made by 
Justice Renquist in his dissent (joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas).  
Identifying two governmental interests – (1) the removal of an incentive for parties 
to intercept private conversations, and (2) the minimization of harm to persons 
whose conversations have been illegally intercepted – the Court deemed them 
insufficient to justify encroachment upon the First Amendment.  Simply put, “in this 
case, privacy concerns [gave] way when balanced against the interest in publishing 
matters of public importance.”280 
As has been mentioned repeatedly, this case presented a clash between two very 
important constitutional rights – privacy and speech.  Sacrificing one at the expense 
of the other, while difficult, was unavoidable.  Logically, then, one might argue that 
regardless of what the Court decided, the case was a victory for civil rights.  While 
that may be true, this author strongly believes that such a circumstance requires, 
more than ever, strict adherence by the Court to the proper standard of review.  Here, 
the Court merely paid lip service to the content-neutral character of the statutes, 
thereafter applying a strict scrutiny analysis to invalidate them.  
Had the Court actually applied the test to which it purportedly subscribed, 
perhaps the civil provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act would be alive to protect an 
interceptee’s interest in his free speech rights.  Indeed, while Bartnicki may seem to 
be a victory for the First Amendment, it is also a defeat in that protecting the 
disclosure of intercepted information will undoubtedly chill the public’s willingness 
to speak freely. 
JESS GAMIERE 
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